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Non-differentiability of Payoff Functions and
Non-uniqueness of Nash Equilibria
Pierre von Mouche
Abstract—Given non-degenerate intervals Xi of R and an increas-
ing ordered mapping Φ : X1× · · · ×XN → RN , games in strategic
form between N players with the Xi as action sets with the following
three properties are studied: the set of Nash equilibria E is convex,
Φ is constant on E and in each Nash equilibrium at least one payoff
function is not partially differentiable w.r.t. its own action. The results
are illustrated for a special class of aggregative games that include
the formal transboundary pollution games with global transboundary
pollution.
Keywords—Aggregative game, convex analysis, formal trans-
boundary pollution game, non-differentiable payoff functions, unique-
ness of Nash equilibria.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following game in strategic form Γ0 between
two players taken from Folmer and von Mouche (2004). Each
player i has action set X i = [0, 2] and payoff function
f i(x1, x2) = ln(xi + 1)−Di(x1 + x2),
where
D1(Q) =
{
1
3Q (Q ∈ [0, 1])
2
3Q
1 − 13 (Q ∈ [1, 2])
,
D2(Q) =
{
1
4Q (Q ∈ [0, 1])
4Q− 154 (Q ∈ [1, 2])
.
A straightforward calculation shows that there are well-defined
reaction functions given by
R1(x2) =
{
1− x2 (0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1/2)
1/2 (1/2 ≤ x2 ≤ 1) ,
R2(x1) = 1− x1.
This implies {(x, 1 − x) | 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1} for the set of Nash
equilibria. Observe the following three properties of Γ0: (1)
the sum of actions is constant (i.e. 1) in each Nash equilibrium,
(2) in each Nash equilibrium no payoff function is partially
differentiable w.r.t. its own action, and (3) the set of Nash
equilibria is convex.
The aim of this article is to give sufficient conditions for
games in strategic form that imply these properties directly.
To this end a theory will be presented for a class of games
G1 in strategic form with special attention to the subclass of
so-called formal transboundary pollution games with global
transboundary pollution, and in particular Γ0. An action of a
player in such a game has the real-world interpretation of the
emission level of a country and the sum of emission levels
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across the countries is interpreted as a deposition level (see,
for instance, Folmer and von Mouche, 2002). A direct result
of this theory is that in a formal transboundary pollution game
with global transboundary pollution each Nash equilibrium has
the same deposition level.
II. SETTING AND NOTATIONS
Let
N
be a positive integer, and write
N := {1, . . . , N}.
Fix
non-degenerate intervals X i (i ∈ N ) of R,
and with
X := X1 × · · · ×XN ,
a mapping Φ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ) : X → RN ,
which will be called co-strategy mapping.1 It is supposed that
Φ is increasing and ordered.2
Write
Y i := ϕi(X) (i ∈ N ), Y := Y 1 × · · · × Y N .
Sufficient for Y i to be an interval is that ϕi is continuous.
Given X1, . . . , XN and Φ, let G0 be the class of games in
strategic form with N as set of players, and for each player i
action set X i. The payoff function of player i will be denoted
by
f i : X→ R.
For the moment there are no further restrictions for the payoff
functions. In the next definition a subclass G1 of G0 will be
defined by assuming some specific properties for the payoff
functions. For Γ ∈ G0 denote the set of Nash equilibria by
E(Γ)
1I thank D. Furth for suggesting this terminology.
2Given a positive integer n, the relations ≥, >, on Rn are defined by:
x ≥ y : xk ≥ yk (1 ≤ k ≤ n); x > y : x ≥ y and x = y; x 
y : xk > yk (1 ≤ k ≤ n). And ≤, <, denote the dual relations of
respectively ≥, >,.
Consider a mapping F : Z → Rn, where Z ⊆ Rm. In this article,
F is called – ordered if for all a,b ∈ Z it holds that F (a) ≥ F (b) or
that F (a) ≤ F (b); – strictly ordered if for all a,b ∈ Z it holds that
F (a)  F (b) or that F (a) = F (b) or that F (a)  F (b); – increasing
if for all a,b ∈ Z one has a ≤ b ⇒ F (a) ≤ F (b); – strongly increasing
if for all a,b ∈ Z one has a < b ⇒ F (a) < F (b).
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and the set of interior Nash equilibria, i.e. the Nash equilibria
that belong to the topological interior Int(X) of X, by
Eint(Γ).
Further notations:3 denote Xıˆ :=
∏N
l=1, l =i X
l
, identify X
with X i × Xıˆ, and accordingly write x ∈ X as x =
(xi;xıˆ). The following notations for a subset I of R are
introduced: l(I) := {min(I)} if min(I) exists and l(I) := ∅ if
min(I) does not exist; r(I) := {max(I)} if max(I) exists and
r(I) := ∅ if max(I) does not exist. Moreover, Int(I) denotes
the interior of I , I− := Int(I)∪ l(I) and I+ := Int(I)∪ r(I).
Note that Int(I) ⊆ I− ⊆ I and Int(I) ⊆ I+ ⊆ I . Also note
that for an interval I , I ⊆ I− ∪ r(I) and I ⊆ I+ ∪ l(I) hold.4
Definition 1: G1 is the subclass of Γ ∈ G0 where for each
player i
I. in each point of E∩(X i+×Xıˆ) the left partial derivative
D−i f
i of f i w.r.t. xi exists as element of R and in each
point of E∩(X i
−
×Xıˆ) the right partial derivative D+i f i
of f i w.r.t. xi exists as element of R.5
II. there exist functions T i+ : X i− × Y i → R and T i− :
X i+ × Y
i → R, such that for all x ∈ E ∩ (X i
−
×Xıˆ)
(D+i f
i)(x) = T i+(x
i, ϕi(x))
and for all x ∈ E ∩ (X i+ ×Xıˆ)
(D−i f
i)(x) = T i
−
(xi, ϕi(x).) 	
Remarks:
1) Sufficient for Property I for i to hold, is concavity of all
conditional payoff functions f i
z
: X i → R (z ∈ Xıˆ).6
In this case even: f i is in each interior point of X i left
and right differentiable w.r.t. xi . Moreover, if max (X i)
exists, then in this point the left derivative exists as
element of R∪{−∞} and if min (X i) exists, then in this
point the right derivative exists as element of R∪{+∞}.
2) Sufficient for Properties I and II for i to hold, is that each
conditional payoff function f i
z
: X i → R is differentiable
and that there exists a function T i : X i × Y → R such
that
(Dif i)(x) = T i(xi, ϕi(x)) (x ∈ X).
Indeed, then take T i+ := T i  X i− × Y i and T i− := T i 
X i+×Y
i
. This situation is referred to as the differentiable
case for player i.
3) In the two formulas in II only the values of T i
−
(T i+) on
a certain subset of X i+ × Y i (X i− × Y i) matter; thus the
T i
−
and T i
−
may be not unique and payoff functions are
not necessarily continuous. But below, as it will turn out,
it is desirable that T i+ and T i− are more broadly defined.
3Also often in notations like E(Γ) the Γ-dependence will be omitted.
4For example, if I =]− 3, 1], then Int(I) =] − 3, 1[, I− = [−3, 1) and
I+ =]− 3, 1].
5
R := R∪{−∞,+∞} denotes the set of extended real numbers and equip
R with the usual arithmetical operations.
6Here f i
z
(xi) = f i(xi; z).
4) If the function ϕi is strictly increasing in xi, and Y i is
an interval of R, then for all a ∈ X
ai ∈ X i
−
⇒ ϕi(a) ∈ Y i
−
,
ai ∈ X i+ ⇒ ϕ
i(a) ∈ Y i+.
To see that, for example, the first implication holds, sup-
pose ai ∈ X i
−
. Because X i is a non-degenerate interval,
there exists bi ∈ X i with bi > ai. Because ϕi is strictly
increasing in xi, it holds that ϕi(ai; aıˆ) < ϕi(bi; aıˆ) and
thus Y i even is a non-degenerate interval. It follows that
ϕi(ai; aıˆ) ∈ Y i \ r(Y i) and ϕi(a) ∈ Y i
−
.
5) Sufficient for Φ to be strictly ordered is that for all i ∈ N ,
ϕi = ciϕ1 where ci > 0.
An important special case of a strictly ordered strongly
increasing co-strategy mapping is
Ξ := (Q, . . . , Q) : X→ RN
with component functions
Q(x) :=
N∑
l=1
Tlx
l,
where Tl > 0 (l ∈ N ).7
6) In practice, given a game in strategic form Γ, it can be
easily checked whether it belongs to G1. Quite a lot of
games in strategic form used in economic theory belong
to G1. For instance, consider an aggregative game, i.e. a
game in strategic form where each strategy set is a non-
degenerate interval of R and where each payoff function
f i is of the form
f i(x1, . . . , xN ) = πi(xi, x1 + · · ·+ xN ),
where, with Y = X1 + · · · + XN , πi : X i × Y → R.
Suppose each πi is differentiable.8 Then Γ ∈ G1 (and the
differentiable case holds). Indeed: take ϕi(x) =∑Nl=1 xl
and define T i : X i × Y → R by
T i(xi, y) = D1πi(xi, y) + D2πi(xi, y).
Lemma 1: Let Γ ∈ G1 and n ∈ X.
1) If n ∈ E, then for all i
ni ∈ X i+ ⇒ T
i
−
(ni, ϕi(n)) ≥ 0,
ni ∈ X i
−
⇒ T i+(n
i, ϕi(n)) ≤ 0.
2) If each conditional payoff function is concave, then
sufficient for n to be a Nash equilibrium is that for each
i with ni ∈ Int(X i)
T i+(n
i, ϕi(n)) ≤ 0 ≤ T i
−
(ni, ϕi(n)),
for i with ni ∈ l(X i)
T i+(n
i, ϕi(n)) ≤ 0,
7Note that Q(X) = T1X1 + · · · + TNXN is a non-degenerate interval
of R.
8
’Differentiable’ needs some comment, while the domain of πi may not
be open. The convention here is that a function f : A → R where A is a
subset of Rn is differentiable if it can be extended to a function on an open
subset U of Rn containing A.
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and for i with ni ∈ r(X i)
T i
−
(ni, ϕi(n)) ≥ 0. 	
Proof.— 1. Property I implies for n ∈ E that for all i
ni ∈ X i+ ⇒ (D
−
i f
i)(n) ≥ 0,
ni ∈ X i
−
⇒ (D+i f
i)(n) ≤ 0.
Next Property II implies the desired result.
2. From convex analysis one knows the following for a
concave real-valued function g on a non-degenerate interval
I of R. Sufficient for a ∈ I to be a maximiser of g is that in
case a ∈ Int(I) one has g′+(a) ≤ 0 ≤ g′−(a), in case a ∈ l(I)
one has g′+(a) ≤ 0 and in case a ∈ r(I) one has g′−(a) ≥ 0.
Now apply this fact together with Property II to g = f i
nıˆ
.
Q.E.D.
For Γ ∈ G1 and i ∈ N , the following eight properties will
be dealt with:
Ai>. For all a,b ∈ E with ϕi(b) > ϕi(a) and bi ∈ X i+, ai ∈
X i
−
,
T i
−
(bi, ϕi(b)) ≥ T i+(a
i, ϕi(a)) ⇒ bi ≤ ai.
Ai
≥
. For all yi ∈ ϕi(E) and bi ∈ X i+, ai ∈ X i−,
T i
−
(bi, yi) ≥ T i+(a
i, yi) ⇒ bi ≤ ai.
Bi1+. T
i
+ is strictly decreasing in its first variable.
Bi1−. T
i
−
is strictly decreasing in its first variable.
Bi1(d). The differentiable case for player i holds and T i is strictly
decreasing in its first variable.
Bi2+. T
i
+ is decreasing in its second variable.
Bi2−. T
i
−
is decreasing in its second variable.
Bi2(d). The differentiable case for player i holds and T i is
decreasing in its second variable.
Moreover, by omitting the superscript in a notation of the
above properties, the corresponding property that holds for
all i is meant. For example A≥ = ∧Ni=1Ai≥.
Proposition 1: Let i ∈ N .
1) Ai
≥
∧ (Bi2+ ∨Bi2−) ⇒ Ai>.
2) Bi1(d) ∩Bi2(d) ⇒ each f iz is strictly concave. 	
Proof.— 1. Suppose a,b ∈ E with ϕi(b) > ϕi(a), bi ∈
X i+, a
i ∈ X i
−
and T i
−
(bi, ϕi(b)) ≥ T i+(a
i, ϕi(a)).
Case Ai
≥
∧ Bi2+. By Bi2+, T i+(ai, ϕi(a)) ≥ T i+(ai, ϕi(b)).
Therefore T i
−
(bi, ϕi(b)) ≥ T i+(a
i, ϕi(b)). Now, by Ai
≥
, bi ≤
ai, as desired.
Case Ai
≥
∧ Bi2−. By Bi2−, T i−(bi, ϕi(b)) ≤ T i−(bi, ϕi(a)).
Therefore T i
−
(bi, ϕi(a)) ≥ T i+(a
i, ϕi(a)). Now, by Ai
≥
, bi ≤
ai, as desired.
2. Because f i
z
: X i → R is differentiable, its strict concavity
is equivalent with strict a strictly increasing derivative f i
z
′
. Let
ai, bi ∈ X i with ai < bi. Because ϕi is increasing in xi, one
has ϕi(ai; z) ≤ ϕi(bi; z). Now, because of Bi1(d) and Bi2(d)
f i
z
′
(ai) = (Dif i)(ai; z) =
T i(ai, ϕi(ai; z)) > T i(bi, ϕi(ai; z))
≥ T i(bi, ϕi(bi; z) = (Dif i)(bi; z) = f iz
′
(bi). Q.E.D.
Note now that Property Bi1(d) ∧ Bi2(d) implies all eight
properties.
III. A UNIQUENESS RESULT
Theorem 1 below provides a uniqueness result for Nash
equilibria for games in the class G1. A stronger version of it
can be found in Folmer and von Mouche (2004).
Proposition 2: Let Γ ∈ G1 and i ∈ N . If Γ has
1) Property Ai>, then for all a,b ∈ E,
ϕi(a) < ϕi(b) ⇒ ai ≥ bi.
2) Property Ai
≥
∧ (Bi2+ ∨B
i
2−), then for all a,b ∈ E,
ϕi(a) ≤ ϕi(b) ⇒ ai ≥ bi. 	
Proof.— 1. If ai ∈ r(X i) or bi ∈ l(X i), then ai ≥ bi holds.
Now suppose ai ∈ r(X i) and bi ∈ l(X i). Then ai ∈ X i
−
and
bi ∈ X i+. By Lemma 1(1),
T i
−
(bi, ϕi(b)) ≥ T i+(a
i, ϕi(a)).
By Property Ai>, bi ≤ ai.
2. If ai ∈ r(X i) or bi ∈ l(X i), then ai ≥ bi holds. Now
suppose ai ∈ r(X i) and bi ∈ l(X i). Then ai ∈ X i
−
and
bi ∈ X i+. By Lemma 1(1),
T i
−
(bi, ϕi(b)) ≥ T i+(a
i, ϕi(a)).
• Case Ai
≥
∧Bi2+. By Property Bi2+,
T i+(a
i, ϕi(a)) ≥ T i+(a
i, ϕi(b)).
Therefore
T i
−
(bi, ϕi(b)) ≥ T i+(a
i, ϕi(b)).
Now, by Property Ai
≥
, bi ≤ ai.
• Case Ai
≥
∧Bi2−. By Property Bi2−,
T i
−
(bi, ϕi(b)) ≤ T i+(b
i, ϕi(a)).
Therefore
T i+(a
i, ϕi(a)) ≤ T i
−
(bi, ϕi(a)).
Now, by Property Ai
≥
, bi ≤ ai.
3. If ai ∈ r(X i) or bi ∈ l(X i), then ai ≥ bi holds. Now
suppose ai ∈ r(X i) and bi ∈ l(X i). Then ai ∈ X i
−
and
bi ∈ X i+. By Lemma 1(1),
T i
−
(bi, ϕi(b)) ≥ T i+(a
i, ϕi(a)). Q.E.D.
Theorem 1: Consider Γ ∈ G1 and suppose Φ  E is strongly
increasing. Then Property A≥ ∧ (B2+ ∨B2−) is sufficient for
Γ to have at most one Nash equilibrium. In particular, it is
sufficient that the differentiable case holds where each T i is
strictly decreasing in its first variable and decreasing in its
second variable. 	
Proof.— Suppose a,b ∈ E. Because Φ  E is ordered, one
has Φ(a) ≥ Φ(b) or Φ(a) ≤ Φ(b). It may be assumed that
Φ(a) ≤ Φ(b), i.e. that ϕi(a) ≤ ϕi(b) (i ∈ N ) holds. By
Proposition 2(2), ai ≥ bi (i ∈ N ), i.e. a ≥ b. Because Φ  E
is increasing, Φ(a) ≥ Φ(a) holds. Thus Φ(a) = Φ(b) and
a ≥ b. Because Φ  E is strongly increasing, it follows that
a = b. Q.E.D.
World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology 53 2009
733
IV. Φ IS CONSTANT ON THE SET OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
Of course under the conditions of Theorem 1, Φ : E → RN
is constant. Here is another sufficient condition:
Theorem 2: If Γ ∈ G1 has Property A> and Φ  E is strictly
ordered, then Φ : E → RN is constant. 	
Proof.— By contradiction. So suppose a,b ∈ E such that
Φ(a) = Φ(b). Let j ∈ N such that ϕj(a) = ϕj(b). It may
be supposed that the strict inequality ϕj(a) < ϕj(b) holds.
Because Φ  E is strictly ordered, this inequality implies
Φ(a)  Φ(b),
i.e. ϕi(a) < ϕi(b) (i ∈ N ). By Proposition 2(1), ai ≥ bi (i ∈
N ), i.e. a ≥ b. Because Φ  E is increasing, Φ(a) ≥ Φ(b)
follows, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Note that by Theorem 2 and Proposition 1(1), for Φ : E →
R
N to be constant it is also sufficient that Γ has Property
A≥ ∧ (B2+ ∨B2−) and Φ  E is strictly ordered.
Define
G1 := {Γ ∈ G1 | Φ : E(Γ) → R
N is constant}.
For each Γ ∈ G1 with E(Γ) = ∅, denote by
Ψ(Γ) = Ψ1(Γ)× · · · ×ΨN(Γ)
the constant value of Φ  E(Γ). Note that Ψ(Γ) ∈ Y ⊆ RN .
In the case where ϕ1 = · · · = ϕN , each coefficient of Ψ(Γ)
is the same and Ψ(Γ) is identified with this coefficient and
denoted by Ψ(Γ) ∈ R; then the sum of actions is constant in
each Nash equilibrium. Below it will become more clear how
Ψ(Γ) is related to Γ.
Lemma 2: Suppose Γ ∈ G1 , each ϕi is strictly increasing in
xi and each Y i is an interval. Then: #E(Γ) ≥ 2 ⇒ Ψ(Γ) ∈
Int(Y). 	
Proof.— Let a,b ∈ E with a = b. By assumption, Ψ =
Φ(a) = Φ(b). Take i such that ai = bi. It may be supposed
that ai < bi. Now ai ∈ X i
−
and bi ∈ X i+. By Remark 5,
Ψi = ϕi(a) ∈ Y i
−
and Ψi = ϕi(b) ∈ Y i+, and therefore
Ψi ∈ Int(Y i). Thus Ψ ∈ Int(Y). Q.E.D.
V. NON-DIFFERENTIABILITY
Proposition 3: Let Γ ∈ G1 , i ∈ N and suppose a,b ∈
E(Γ) with ai < bi.
1) Suppose Property Bi1− holds. Then: ai ∈ Int(X i) ⇒
f i is not partially differentiable w.r.t. xi in a.
2) Suppose Property Bi1+ holds. Then: bi ∈ Int(X i) ⇒
f i is not partially differentiable w.r.t. xi in b. 	
Proof.— 1. By contradiction. So suppose all conditions hold
and f i partially differentiable w.r.t. xi in a. Because Γ ∈ G1 ,
ϕi(a) = ϕi(b) = Ψi holds. Note that ai ∈ X i
−
and bi ∈ X i+.
Because a,b ∈ E, it holds by Lemma 1(1) that
T i+(a
i,Ψi) ≤ 0 ≤ T i
−
(bi,Ψi).
Because T i
−
is strictly increasing in its first variable and ai ∈
X i+,
T i
−
(bi,Ψi) < T i
−
(ai,Ψi).
Therefore
T i+(a
i,Ψi) < T i
−
(ai,Ψi).
Because f i is partially differentiable w.r.t. xi in a, the equality
T i+(a
i,Ψi) = T i
−
(ai,Ψi) holds, a contradiction.
2. As in 1, one obtains
T i+(a
i,Ψi) ≤ 0 ≤ T i
−
(bi,Ψi).
Because T i+ is strictly increasing in its first variable and bi ∈
X i
−
,
T i+(b
i,Ψi) < T i+(a
i,Ψi).
Therefore
T i+(b
i,Ψi) < T i
−
(bi,Ψi).
Because f i is partially differentiable w.r.t. xi in b, the equality
T i+(b
i,Ψi) = T i
−
(bi,Ψi) holds, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3: Consider Γ ∈ G1 where all functions T i−
and T i+ are strictly decreasing in their first variable. Then
#Eint(Γ) ≥ 2 implies that for each interior Nash equilibrium
n at least one payoff function is not partially differentiable in
n w.r.t. its own action.9 	
Proof.— Fix n ∈ Eint. Let a ∈ Eint with a = n. Let i be
such that ai = ni. Now apply Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
VI. CONVEXITY OF THE SET OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
Given Γ ∈ G1, i ∈ N and yi ∈ Y i, define the subset W iyi
of R by
W iyi := {x
i ∈ Int(X i) | T i+(x
i, yi) ≤ 0 ≤ T i
−
(xi, yi)}∪
{xi ∈ r(X i) | T i
−
(xi, yi) ≥ 0}∪{xi ∈ l(X i) | T i+(x
i, yi) ≤ 0}.
Lemma 3: Let Γ ∈ G1, i ∈ N and yi ∈ Y i. Sufficient for
Wi
yi
to be convex is that Property Bi1 holds. 	
Proof.— Suppose ai, bi ∈W i
yi
with ai < bi and let λ ∈]0, 1[.
Then ai ∈ X i
−
, bi ∈ X i+ and for ci = λai +(1−λ)bi one has
ai < ci < bi and thus ci ∈ Int(X i). Because of Bi1+ ∧Bi1−,
T i+(c
i, yi) ≤ T i+(a
i, yi) ≤ 0 ≤ T i
−
(bi, yi) ≤ T i
−
(ci, yi),
and thus ci ∈ Wi
yi
. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4: Consider Γ ∈ G1 where each function T i is
strictly decreasing in its first variable, each conditional payoff
function is concave and Φ is affine.10 Then E(Γ) is convex. 	
Proof.— Φ<−1>(Ψ) = {x ∈ X | Φ(x) = Ψ} = {x ∈
R
N | A(x) + a = Ψ} ∩ X. Because Φ is affine and X is
convex, it follows that Φ<−1>(Ψ) is a convex subset of RN .
It now will be proved that
E = (W 1Ψ1 × · · · ×W
N
ΨN ) ∩ Φ
<−1>(Ψ).
By Lemma 3 then Eint is convex.
9The own action of fj is xj .
10I.e. there exist a linear mapping A : RN → RN and a ∈ RN such that
Φ(x) = A(x) + a (x ∈ RN ).
World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology 53 2009
734
′ ⊇′: suppose x ∈ (W 1Ψ1 × · · · ×W
N
ΨN ) ∩ Φ
<−1>(Ψ), i.e.
Φ(x) = Ψ and xi ∈W iΨi (i ∈ N ). Now for each i,
ϕi(x) = Ψi,
xi ∈ Int(X i) ⇒ T i+(x
i, ϕi(x)) ≤ 0 ≤ T i
−
(xi, ϕi(x)),
xi ∈ r(X i) ⇒ T i
−
(xi, ϕi(x)) ≥ 0,
xi ∈ l(X i) ⇒ T i+(x
i, ϕi(x)) ≤ 0.
So, by Lemma 1(2), x ∈ E. Thus x ∈ Eint.
′ ⊆′: suppose x ∈ E. Because Φ(x) = Ψ, it holds that
x ∈ Φ<−1>(Ψ), By Lemma 1(1),
xi ∈ Int(X i) ⇒ T i+(x
i,Ψi) ≤ 0 ≤ T i
−
(xi,Ψi),
xi ∈ r(X i) ⇒ T i
−
(xi, ϕi(x)) ≥ 0,
xi ∈ l(X i) ⇒ T i+(x
i, ϕi(x)) ≤ 0.
Now xi ∈ W iΨi (i ∈ N ) and thus x ∈ W
1
Ψ1 × · · · ×W
N
ΨN .
Q.E.D.
Theorem 4 is more or less a generalisation of a result in
Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1982) for homogeneous Cournot
oligopoly games; although the result is more general, the given
proof is simpler.
Theorems 2 and 4 imply:
Corollary 1: Suppose Γ ∈ G1, Φ = Ξ, each conditional
payoff function is concave, #Eint(Γ) ≥ 2, and that Γ has
Property A> ∧B1+ ∧B1−. Then
1) Φ  E(Γ) is constant.
2) E(Γ) is convex.
3) For each interior Nash equilibrium n at least one payoff
function is not partially differentiable in n w.r.t. its own
action. 	
VII. FORMAL TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION GAMES
Definition 2: Consider G0 in case X i = [0,mi] (i ∈ N )
and co-strategy mapping Ξ. Ga denotes the subclass of Γ ∈ G0
where for each player i:
a. the payoff function is
f i(x) = P i(xi)−Di(Q(x)),
where P i : X i → R and Di : Q(X) → R.
b. Di is continuous, convex and strictly increasing;
c. P i is continuous, strictly concave and strictly increasing. 	
Remarks:
7. Each payoff function is continuous and each conditional
payoff function is strictly concave.
8. The games in Ga are aggregative.
9. Ga is the class of formal transboundary games with global
transboundary pollution (see, for instance, Folmer and
von Mouche, 2002).
Proposition 4: Ga ⊆ G1 . 	
Proof.— Let Γ ∈ Ga. First it will be shown that Γ ∈ G1.
Because each conditional payoff function is concave, Property
I holds. And because P i and −Di are concave, one has (using
Remark 4)
(Di
−
f i)(x) = (P i)
′
−
(xi)− Ti(Di)
′
−
(Q(x)) (x ∈ X i+ ×X
ıˆ),
(Di+f
i)(x) = (P i)
′
+(x
i)− Ti(Di)
′
+(Q(x)) (x ∈ X
i
−
×Xıˆ).
This implies that Property II holds if the functions T i+ : X i−×
Y i → R, T i
−
: X i+ × Y
i → R are defined as follows:
T i+(x
i, yi) := (P i)
′
+(x
i)−Ti(Di)
′
+(y
i) (xi ∈ X i
−
, yi ∈ Y i
−
);
T i
−
(xi, yi) := (P i)
′
−
(xi)−Ti(Di)
′
−
(yi) (xi ∈ X i+, y
i ∈ Y i+);
T i
−
and T i+ arbitrary elsewhere.
Let Γ ∈ Ga. Next it will be proved that Γ has Property A>
(and then Γ ∈ G1 by Theorem 2). Suppose a,b ∈ E with
Q(b) > Q(a) and bi ∈ X i+ and ai ∈ X i− such that
T i
−
(bi, Q(b)) ≥ T i+(a
i, Q(a)).
Because Di is convex and Q(b) > Q(a),
(Di)
′
−
(Q(b)) ≥ (Di)
′
+(Q(a)).
Now
(P i)
′
−
(bi) = T i
−
(bi, Q(b)) + Ti(Di)
′
−
(Q(b))
≥ T i+(a
i, Q(a)) + Ti(Di)
′
−
(Q(b))
= (P i)
′
+(a
i)+Ti((Di)
′
−
(Q(b))−(Di)
′
+(Q(a))) ≥ (P
i)
′
+(a
i).
Thus (P i)′
−
(bi) ≥ (P i)′+(a
i). Because P i is strictly concave,
bi ≤ ai follows. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5: Let Γ ∈ Ga and suppose #E(Γ) ≥ 2. Let
Z := {i ∈ N | there exists a,b ∈ E with ai = bi}.
Then
1) For i ∈ Z , the function Di is not differentiable in Ψ(Γ).
2) In each Nash equilibrium each f i (i ∈ Z) is not partially
differentiable w.r.t. its own action. 	
Proof.— 1. By contradiction. So suppose i ∈ Z and Di is
differentiable in Ψ. Let a,b ∈ E with ai = bi. It may be
supposed that ai < bi. One has Q(a) = Q(b) = Ψ. Because
ai ∈ X i
−
, bi ∈ X i+ Lemma 1(1) gives T i−(bi,Ψ) ≥ 0 and
T i(ai,Ψ) ≤ 0. Therefore,
(P i)
′
+(a
i) ≤ Ti(Di)
′
+(Ψ) and (P
i)
′
−
(bi) ≥ Ti(Di)
′
−
(Ψ).
Because P i is strictly concave,
P i
′
+(a
i) > P i
′
−
(bi).
Thus (Di)′+(Ψ) > (Di)
′
−
(Ψ). However, this is impossible
because Di is differentiable in Ψ.
2. With 1. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2: Let Γ ∈ Ga. If each Di is differentiable (in
Ψ(Γ)), then #E(Γ) ≤ 1. 	
Without the differentiability condition, Corollary 2 does not
hold anymore. Indeed, the analysis of the game Γ0 in section I
shows that in that case there even may be infinitely many Nash
equilibria.
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